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"Computer Law." It has a nice ring to it, but what is it? Is it a 
field of law? Is it the law of an industry? Is it a discipline? It's proba­
bly all three, but primarily, it's a challenge to established legal 
Traditionally, fields of law have been industry-independent, per­
haps because of the training that lawyers receive in law school. Re­
quired courses usually include contracts, torts, procedure, criminal 
law, property, tax, and business law. Elective courses include such 
esoterica as intellectual property, intemationallaw, antitrust, and the 
• Partner, Bigelow & Saltzberg, Woburn, Massachusetts; Of Counsel, Warner & 
Stackpole, Boston, Massachusetts. Past President, Computer Law Association; Editor, 
Computer Law Service; formerly Adjunct Professor of Computer and Information Science, 
Dartmouth College; A.B. Harvard University, 1950; J.D. Harvard University, 1953. 
397 

398 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:397 
Uniform Commercial Code.! 
Lawyers often carry these fields into practice: trusts and estates, 
taxation, business law, and civil litigation. In the commercial world, 
however, clients don't care how a field of law is defined by the law 
schools or by lawyers. Clients look for solutions to problems. Fields 
of law are irrelevant to the client; management just wants the right 
answers. 
In any industry, competent service to clients requires a basic un­
derstanding of many "law-school-defined" fields of law. For example, 
the lawyer who represents a bank and trust company must be familiar 
with the Uniform Commercial Code, the law of trusts, wills and es­
tates, federal and state taxation, and the numerous laws and regula­
tions that affect the client's operations.2 Traditional courses do not 
teach this. Fortunately, law schools have, to some degree, recognized 
this fact and do offer some industry-oriented courses such as securities 
law and insurance law. And some law schools now offer a course in 
computer law. To the extent that these courses draw upon concepts 
from traditional fields of law (and expose such concepts to rigorous 
examination), the law, indeed society, will be well served. 
II. TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES THE LAW 
Each new technological advance creates new legal problems and 
calls for reevaluation of old concepts. For example, the law of copy­
right in published works stems from the development of the printing 
press. According to one respected source,3 authors' rights were recog­
nized on principles of natural justice long before Blackstone, but the 
development of the first copyright law4 resulted from efforts by the 
Stationers Company to perpetuate its monopoly of the right to print 
(and to censor) whatever was published in England. 
In many ways, the history of technology is the history of commu­
nications. The development of the railroad led to the establishment of 
the Interstate Commerce cOmmission. The development of the auto­
1. Lest readers quarrel on whether the Uniform Commercial Code is esoteric, it is 
my understanding that even such an alleged educational leader as Harvard Law School has 
no course covering the entire Code. Some articles of the Code are touched upon in other 
courses! 
2. For example, a national bank may well be regulated by three different federal 
agencies: the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, and 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systems. Such banks may also, under cer­
tain circumstances, be subject to de facto (if not de jure) regulation by state banking 
departments. 
3. A. LATMAN, CoPYIUGHT LAW (5th ed. 1979). 
4. The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19 (1710). 
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mobile led to the licensing provisions of the several states and even of 
the federal government. S The development of the airplane led to the 
Federal Aviation Administration and the late (and sometimes la-· 
mented) Civil Aeronautics Board. 
In the telecommunications field, the invention of telegraph, tele­
phone, radio, and cable has led to regulation at the federal and state 
level. The Interstate Commerce Commission was given authority to 
regulate wire and radio communications as early as 1910.6 While ra­
dio regulation was assigned to the Federal Radio Commission in 
1927,7 the ICC continued to regulate telecommunications on the inter­
state level. In 1934, Congress brought both technologies back under 
one agency (the Federal Communications Commission) through the 
Communications Act of 1934.8 At the same time, state regulation of 
telecommunications was proceeding.9 Cable TV is subject to both 
state lO and federal 1 1 regulation. 
New technology upsets balances established under old technol­
ogy. And so it has been with the computer, now a pervasive machine, 
although not yet fifty years old. The regulatory response has been, as 
yet, comparatively minimal, but the technology is still new. 
Yet the computer industry is still subject to many specific regula-:­
tions. Any attempt to list each of these regulations, especially at the 
state level, is a task for an encyclopedist, not a practicing attorney. 
However, the following are offered as examples: 
A. Telecommunications 
In 1966, the Federal Communications Commission began an in­
quiry into the relationship between computers and telecommunica­
tions.12 Following a tentative13 and a final decision,14 which was 
5. For example, the 55 mph speed limit. 
6. R. Wiley, Competition and Deregulation in Telecommunications: The American 
Experience, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE U.S.: TRENDS AND POLICIES 40 (1981). 
7. Federal Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). 
8. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934Xcodified at 47 U.S.C. § 5 
(1982»(repealed 1969). 
9. See. e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166 (West 1970) which is derived in part 
from Stat. 1851, ch. 247. 
10. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166A (West 1976). 
11. CATV Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1984). 
12. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com­
puter and Communications Services and Facilities, Docket No. 16979, November 9, 1966, 
7 F.C.C.2d 11, 1 C.L.S.R. 645 (1965). 
13. 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 1 C.L.S.R. 665 (1970). 
14. 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 1 C.L.S.R. 692 (1971). 
400 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:397 
modified on appeal, IS the Commission entered a final order l6 in 
1973-six and a half years after the inquiry began. But technology 
marches on. By 1976, the Commission felt it necessary to begin a fur­
ther inquiry into the relationship between computers and communica­
tions,17 again followed by a tentative decision,18 a final decision,19 a 
reconsideration,20 and a court appeal.21 
The entire telecommunications world was turned upside down by 
the government's antitrust action against American Telephone & Tele­
graph Company in which a consent decree, issued in 1976,22 was mod­
ified by a federal court in the District of Columbia in which a 
subsequent action had been brought. 23 
The Federal Communications Commission, state public utility 
commissions, the Department of Justice, and the Federal District 
Court for the District of Columbia are currently involved in regulating 
or deregulating telecommunications, and attempting to apply the com­
puter rules developed by the FCC to various telecommunications enti­
ties. The result is much work for lawyers and many headaches for 
business. 
B. Computer-Produced Radio Interference 
Computers emit radio frequency waves that may create problems 
for those using other equipment. The Federal Communications Com­
mission has issued regulations limiting the interference that computers 
can produce through radio emissions.24 In at least one case, a manu­
facturer's liability for such emissions was held to be a jury question.2s 
C. Banking and Finance 
In the banking field, there has been much federal and state legisla­
15. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 3 C.L.S.R. 592 (2nd Cir. 1973). 
16. 40 F.C.C.2d 293, 3 C.L.S.R. 867 (1973). 
17. Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 61 
F.C.C.2d 103, 5 C.L.S.R. 1381 (1976). 
18. 72 F.C.C.2d 358, 6 C.L.S.R. 1434 (1979). 
19. 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 7 C.L.S.R. 769 (1980). 
20. 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 7 C.L.S.R. 1302 (1980). 
21. Computer and Communications Indus. Assoc. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). 
22. United States v. Western Elect. Co., 1 C.L.S.R. 24 (1956). 
23. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981)(motion to dismiss 
after plainti1rs case denied); 47 Fed. Reg. 4166,4167 (1982)(Parties agreed to Modification 
of Final Judgment); when final judgment was further modified, it was entered by the court, 
552 F.Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982), a./J'd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
24. 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.907, 15.810, 15.812, .15.830, 15.832 (1983). 
25. Page County Appliance Center, Inc. v. Honeywell, 357 N.W.2d 71 (Iowa 1984). 
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tion. Among the issues considered are a bank holding company's au­
thority to establish a data processing subsidiary26 and the procedures 
required for national banks to establish automated teller machines 
(ATMs).27 Congress has enacted the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act,28 and the Federal Reserve Board has adopted Regulation E pur­
suant thereto.29 The most recent federal law affecting banking is the 
amendment to the Criminal Code making unauthorized actions in 
connection with computers of federally-insured institutions a criminal 
offense.30 
D. Maintenance and Service 
Are the maintenance personnel servlCmg government-owned 
computers subject to the Service Contract Act of 1965?31 The Reagan 
Administration's final rules exempting such employees from the appli­
cations of the Act became effective in 1983.32 But some kinds of com­
puter services, such as data collection, processing, analysis, 
keypunching, and key verifying are specifically covered by the Act.33 
E. Copyright 
From a permissible registration under the Rule of Doubt,34 com­
puter programs clearly became subject matter for copyright, and right­
ful owners of copies are given specified rights by statute. 35 
The foregoing are merely a few areas in which computers have 
encountered the law. Other areas include retail price marking regula­
tion,36 application of state public records acts,37 and the heavy empha­
26. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.c. § 1841 (1841); and Regulation Y, specif­
ically 12 C.F.R. § 225.118 (1984). 
27. 49 Fed. Reg. 45,007 (1984). 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982). 
29. 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 (1984). 
30. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, ch. 47, 98 Stat. 
2190 (1984) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2102). For a discussion offederallaw and unauthor­
ized computer use see Soma, Legal Analysis of Electronic Bulletin Board Activities, 7 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 571, 606-08 (1985). 
31. 41 U.S.c. §§ 351-358 (1982). 
32. 9 C.F.R. § 4. 123(e)(I)(i) (1984). 
33. 9 C.F.R. § 4.130 (1984). 
34. Copyright Office Circular 31D, January 1965,6 C.L.S.R. 1167. 
35. 17 U.S.c. §§ 101, 117 (1983); see also Bender, Software Protection: The 1985 
Perspective, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405 (1985); Stern, Section 117 of the Copyright Act: 
Charter ofthe Software Users' Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459 
(1985). 
36. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 940 § 3. 13(1)(a)(1978), validated in Purity Supreme, 
Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762, 407 N.E.2d 297, 7 C.L.S.R. 1212 (1980). 
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sis upon privacy catalyzed by the computer.38 
III. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO LEGAL CONCEPTS 
Advances in technology throw doubt not only upon laws of sci­
ence,39 but, with more frequency, upon the laws of man. The nature 
of software provides an example of how the law may have to change to 
accommodate fact. 
Federal tax law has developed so that the government receives 
more if a product is intangible, because no investment tax credit is 
available, and amortization can be only on a straightline basis. State 
. and local communities, on the other hand, levy sales, use, and personal 
property taxes. But most states permit such levies only on tangibles. 
Since software is information recorded on magnetic media for the 
most part, it is not surprising that the federal government has held 
that software is intangible, and state governments have often decided 
that the same software is tangible.40 
But the problems of tangibility or intangibility of software extend 
beyond taxation. For example, in one of the earliest computer crime 
cases,41 the defendant attempted to peddle stolen computer programs 
on punched cards. Defendant's counsel argued that the value of the 
theft should be determined by the value of the punched cards, rather 
than by the value of the information contained on the cards. After he 
37. See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 48 Ohio St. 2d 283,358 N.E.2d 565, 6 C.L.S.R. 367 
(1976). 
38. The literature in the privacy area is extraordinarily extensive. See Solomon, Per­
sonal Privacy and the "/984" Syndrome. 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 753 (1985). Professors 
Arthur Miller of Harvard and Alan Westin of Columbia have gained national reputations 
for their studies on privacy. Even this author has written in the field, from testimony 
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate. 92d Congress, March 10. 1971, printed in Federal Data Banks. Computers 
and the Bill of Rights published by the Committee, Part 1, page 680, to a paper to be 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association July 17, 1985 in 
London. 
39. See Report of the Special Master, Newman v. Massinghoff. No. 83-0001 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 28, 1984), in which the plaintiff's effort to patent an "energy generation system having 
higher energy output than input" was denied by the Patent and Trademark Office because 
it violated the second law of thermodynamics. The court, following the recommendation of 
a special master (William Schuyler, former Commissioner of Patents), ordered the Patent 
and Trademark Office to examine the patent application rather than just treat it as impossi­
ble. See also Smith, An Endless Siege ofImplausible Invention. SCIENCE. Nov. 16. 1984 at 
817. 
40. Bigelow, The Computer and the Tax Collector, 30 EMORY L.J. 357 (1981). For a 
further discussion of the tangibility or intangibility of computer software. see McGee. Fi­
nancial and Tax Accounting for Computer Software, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 651, 655 
(1985). 
41. Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906, 1 C.L.S.R. 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). 
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was convicted of grand larceny,42 the defendant brought a habeus 
corpus action specifically on the grounds that the punched cards were 
worth, at the most, $35 as scrap paper (since the cards were full of 
holes). His petition was denied.43 
What is the status of software under the Uniform Commercial 
Code? Section 2-105(1) defines goods to mean, "All things ... which 
are movable at the time of identification in the contract for sale 
...." Divers things, including natural gas,44 electricity,45 and the 
compiling, editing, and publishing of pamphlets,46 have been held to 
be "goods." Furthermore, an entire computer system (including the 
software and installation) has been held to be a good.47 However, con­
tracts for the performance of data processing services are not contracts 
for the sale of goods.48 In a facilities management contract (a service 
transaction), the software was held to be tangible and subject to re­
plevin.49 However, software is often licensed, rather than sold. Is a 
license a good? In Tomb v. Lavalle,50 it was held that a liquor license 
was a general intangible, not a good;SI therefore, the U.C.c. did not 
apply to its sale. In Peterson v. Wildcat Mountain Jfanagement 
Corp.,52 it was held that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for 
breach of UCC warranty for injuries in a ski mishap, because the sale 
of a ski lift ticket did not constitute the sale of a good. 
Even if software is considered to be goods under the Uniform 
42. [d. at 911. 
43. Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552, 553, 1 C.L.S.R. 858 (5th Cir. 1967). 
44. Pioneer Hi-Bread Com Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 638. 306 
N.E.2d 337, 14 U.C.c. Rep. 623 (1973). 
45. Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, 179,278 N.E.2d 608.609­
10, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 333, 334 (1972); contra Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison 
Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 328,196 N.W.2d 316, 317, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 977,978 (1972). 
46. Lake Wales Publishing Co. v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So. 2d 335, 336, 19 
U.C.C. Rep. 1360, 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
47. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769, 34 U.C.C. 
Rep. 1088, 1090,7 C.L.S.R. 36, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737, 
7 C.L.S.R. 224 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Judge Freedman's doubts on this question in Samuel 
Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-30777-F (D. Mass. filed Dec. 18, 1981) reprinted in 
full in Saltzberg & Heffernan, Performance Claims in the Sales of Computers, 7 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 529, 554 (1985). 
48. Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, 655, 9 U.C.C. 
Rep. 851, 852, 3 C.L.S.R. 58, 59 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 906,3 C.L.S.R. 64 (4th Cir. 
1971). 
49. F&M Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988, 992-93, 6 
C.L.S.R. 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See Gordon & Starr, Software Development Contracts 
and Consulting Arrangements: A Structure for Enforceability and Practicality, 7 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 487, 493 (1985). 
50. 298 Pa. Super. 75, 444 A.2d 666, 32 U.C.C. Rep. 677 (1981). 
51. [d. at 77-79, 444 A.2d at 667-68, 32 U.C.C. Rep. at 678. 
52. 34 U.C.C. Rep. 1127 (D. R.I. 1982). 
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Commercial Code, software may not be goods for other purposes. 53 
For example, a patent license agreement has, under the Robinson-Pat­
man Act, been held to be the sale of an intangible right of use rather 
than the sale of goods. 54 Courts, however, are divided as to whether 
electricity is a commodity under the Robinson-Patman Act.55 
The answer to these problems turns in part on the concepts of 
tangibility and movability. Have such concepts outlived their useful­
ness? Or perhaps we have come full circle. According to Radin, "The 
distinction between movables and immovables despite its transcendent 
practical importance was not made the basis of a legal classification" 
in ancient Roman law.56 
But the distinction appears to be crucial to taxing authorities and 
those who seek to apply Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Does it make any real difference whether software recorded on a cas­
sette is a separate tangible item, rather than the mere representation of 
intellectual property - the embodiment of what has been licensed by 
the owner for another's use? Such a distinction is likely a concern 
only to those who worry about the purity and the symmetry of the 
law. Does the tangibility or intangibility of software for tax purposes 
really matter? Pragmatically, the federal, state, and local governments 
will interpret statutes to produce revenue. The fact that the same 
computer program may be tangible under one law and intangible 
under another will not delay the tax collectors on their appointed 
rounds. 
What these questions do illustrate is that new technologies - of 
which computers are but one example - create anomalies in the law 
and require each generation oflawyers (and law professors) to reexam­
ine basic legal concepts. The lawyer whose practice is serving the 
needs of an industry may become aware of the need for such reexami­
nation before the scholar who is an expert in the law of sales or federal 
taxation does. Technological advancement mandates that the teacher 
and the practitioner interact. The articles that follow will, hopefully, 
aid this dialogue. 
53. See generally Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the UCC, 77 MICH. L. 
REv. 1149 (1979). 
54. LaSalle St. Press, Inc. v. McConnick and Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004, 
1005-06 (D.m. 1968), affd, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971). 
55. Compare City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir. 
1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1170; with City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power, 497 
F. Supp. 1040, 1052, affd in part and remanded on other grounds, 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 
1981). 
56. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW at 335 (1927). See also BoUVIER DIC­
TIONARY 2265 (3rd ed. 1914). 
